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FUTURE ADVANCES UNDER
THE ULTA AND THE USLTA: THE
CONSTRUCTION LENDER RECEIVES A NEW
STATUS
The prevalence of future advance clauses, in construction mort-
gageS2 and the dearth of well-defined laws concerning the security
and priority status of such advances 3 have combined to produce much
uncertainty among real property lienholders as to the priority of their
claims in foreclosure proceedings.' The law of future advances has
evolved primarily in case law,5 and thus disparity exists from state
to state.' Even when specific guidelines have been enunciated by the
courts,' the interpretation and application of those guidelines have
not been uniform.' Perceiving a need for statutory reform, several
states have passed legislation concerning future advances Neverthe-
less, the current lack of uniform authority, either statutory or non-
statutory, presents continuing priority problems, particularly for the
construction lender.'
0
Two proposed uniform statutes, the Uniform Land Transactions
Act (ULTA)" and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act
The typical future advance clause provides that the debt which the mortgage
secures represents in whole or in part advances to be made or obligations to be incurred
by the lender subsequent to the time when the security agreement is executed. See 2
G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.1, at 916 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE]; G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES §
113, at 178 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE].
2 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 35.3, at 922; OSBORNE, supra note 1, § 113, at
178-79.
See 2 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 35.4, at 930; see also notes 6 and 9 infra.
4 Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities Prob-
lem-The "Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TENN. L. REv. 311 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Kratovil & Werner]; Skipworth, Should Construction Lenders Lose Out on Voluntary
Advances If a Loan Turns Sour? 5 REAL ESTATE L.J. 221 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Skipworth].
5 2 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 35.4, at 930; Kratovil & Werner, supra note 4, at 320.
8 See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 179 (1961).
7 See text accompanying notes 24-35 infra.
See note 6 supra.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04 (West 1969); MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP.]
§ 7-102 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-67 to -74. (1976 RepI. Vol). Some statutes,
however, simply perpetuate certain concepts as developed in case law. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-70(a) and § 45-70(b)(1976 Repl. Vol.).
, See note 4 supra.
" The Uniform Land Transactions Act [hereinafter cited as ULTA] was ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in Au-
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(USLTA),' 2 which have been approved and recommended for enact-
ment in the states by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, deal with the security and priority status of real
property future advances.'3 Arguably, the peculiarly local character
often attributed to realty in the United States" represents a formida-
ble barrier to any widespread enactment of the complete texts of both
acts or of any uniform act concerning real estate law. 15 The recognized
need for uniformity in the area of mortgage foreclosures,'" however,
gust, 1975. Article 1 of the Act contains definitions and general provisions applicable
to both sales and secured transactions; Article 2 concerns leases and sales of real estate;
and Article 3 deals with secured transactions. The structure of the three articles follows
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Articles 1, 2, and 9. See generally ULTA, Prefa-
tory Note, at vii-x.
Pursuant to recommendation made by its Special Committee on the Uniform
Land Transactions Act, the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association recommended that the A.B.A. disapprove the ULTA in its
present form. While the section reaffirmed its concern for the principle of uniformity,
it concluded that "in the field of real property uniformity can best be achieved by
concentrating in the first instance upon specific areas of general interest, such as
mortgage foreclosures, with which only one portion of the current act is concerned."
A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L., 5 PROB. & PROP. 8 (Special Issue 1976)
[hereinafter cited as PROB. & PROP.]. The House of Delegates of the A.B.A. has not
yet considered the ULTA.
,z The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act [hereinafter cited as
USLTA] was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August, 1976. Article 1 of the Act contains definitions and general
provisions applicable throughout the act; Article 2 concerns conveyancing and record-
ing; Article 3 deals with priorities, marketable record title, and extinguishment of
claims; Article 4 provides for the recording of statutory liens and pending judicial
proceedings; Article 5 concerns construction liens (mechanics' and materialmen's
liens); Article 6 governs the maintenance of public land records; and Article 7 contains
transitional and repealer provisions. See generally USLTA Prefatory Note, at 3-4.
The Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the A.B.A. has not yet
stated its position on the USLTA, and the ABA House of Delegates has not yet
considered the Act.
13 ULTA §§ 1-201(5), 3-205(c)-(f), 3-301(b); USLTA §§ 1-201(14), 3-202(a)(8), 3-
209, 5-209(b),(c).
" The reasons commonly given for the contention that real property, unlike per-
sonalty, possesses a "unique" character are that realty is permanent, immovable and
durable, and has deep-rooted local significance.
'1 See note 14 supra. Whether or not it is valid to assume that because land is
"unique" uniformity cannot be achieved among the states in the area of modern real
estate law, the mere fact that the assumption is often made creates an obstacle to
adoption of a uniform act concerning land transactions. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform
Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64 GEO. L. REv. 1245, 1246 (1976).
,1 ULTA art. 3, Introductory Comment, at 9. See 5 PROB. & PROP., supra note 11,
at 8; H.R. 10688, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1973). In § 402, which concerns a proposal
to establish a uniform foreclosure system for mortgages insured, guaranteed or owned
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should prompt state legislatures to give careful consideration to the
specific sections in each proposed act that deal with real estate fi-
nancing.'" The provisions relating to the security and priority of fu-
ture advances thus deserve scrutiny to determine the changes that
the two statutory schemes would make in the existing law, individu-
ally as well as collectively,' 8 and the objectives the drafters sought to
by federal agencies, Congress found that "the availability of a uniform, less expensive
and more expeditious foreclosure procedure" is required to ameliorate high costs and
risks imposed on homeowners, to facilitate the sale and resale in nationwide secondary
mortgage markets of secured real estate loans and to reduce unnecessary litigation in
the courts. Id.
,1 Article 3 of the ULTA is devoted exclusively to consensual security interests in
real estate. Part 1 defines the scope of the article and contains definitions applicable
throughout the article; Part 2 concerns the validity of security agreements and the
rights of parties thereto; Part 3 defines priorities between conflicting security interests
in the same collateral; Part 4 deals with finance dharges and usury; and Part 5 concerns
default and foreclosure. Article 3 expressly excludes from its scope non-consensual
security interests in real estate, including mechanics' liens. ULTA § 3-104.
Article 3 of the USLTA addresses priority questions, and Article 5 of the Act deals
comprehensively with the subject of mechanics' liens.
'" As individual statutes, the ULTA and the USLTA do not deal comprehensively
with the subject of future advances. While there is some overlap between the acts
concerning future advances in general, and those made under construction security
agreements, see note 22 infra, in particular, each statute contains gaps that appear to
be filled only by provisions in the other. For example, the ULTA expressly allows that
obligations secured by a security agreement may include future advances, that such
advances need not be made "pursuant to commitment," see text accompanying notes
44-45 infra, and that advances may not exceed a maximum amount stated in the
agreement. ULTA § 3-205(c). Furthermore, under the ULTA, advances made under a
construction security agreement "to enable completion of the contemplated improve-
ment" are deemed secured by the security agreement even though the agreement does
not provide for advances and even if they cause the total of future advances to exceed
the stated maximum amount. ULTA § 3-205(e)(2). The USLTA, however, contains no
provision concerning the basic security status of future advances. Rather, that security
status which is explicitly set forth in the ULTA must be inferred from USLTA provi-
sions concerning priority of future advances. See USLTA §§ 3-209, 5-209.
At the same time, the USLTA specifically addresses the crucial question of prior-
ity of advances made by a construction lender as against mechanics' liens, see USLTA
§ 5-209(c)(1), while the ULTA does not. Moreover, since ULTA § 3-104(3) expressly
provides that Article 3 of that Act does not apply to mechanics' liens, the priority
status accorded advances made by a lender under ULTA § 3-301(b) clearly does not
protect advances from intervening mechanics' lien claims. Rather, the mechanics' lien
statute operative in a particular state continues to determine the priority status of the
mechanics' lienor. In Virginia, for instance, the mechanics' lienor receives complete
priority with respect to the building, even over a mortgagee who recorded prior to the
date of attachment of the mechanics' lien. VA. CODE § 43-21 (1976 RepI. Vol.). The
ULTA unlike the USLTA, effects no change in the operation of the Virginia statute.
For a general discussion of the varied rules of mechanics' liens applied in the different
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achieve by these changes. 9 Since future advances are a common and
significant feature in construction mortgages," particular attention
should be paid the special rules' provided for advances made under
construction security agreements 2 and the policy decisions underly-
ing those rules.?
states, see OSBORNE, supra note 1, at §§ 215, 216.
Both the ULTA and the USLTA resulted from a single drafting project concerning
land transactions initially undertaken by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1968. In 1974, the first draft of the ULTA, which contained
an article comparable to Article 5 of the USLTA concerning mechanics' liens, was
presented to the Conference at its annual meeting. Considerable controversy, however,
particularly concerning the article on mechanics' lien, led to a decision to divide the
project into three component acts: the ULTA, the USLTA and a Uniform Condomi-
niums Act. Thus, the proposed article on mechanics' liens was not included in the final
version of the ULTA as approved and recommended by the Conference in 1975. See
Letter of John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, June 16, 1977, on file in WASH. & LEE L. REv. office,
Lexington, Va., 24450 [hereinafter cited as McCabe Letter].
Since the mechanics' lienor may well be a lender's most formidable competitor
for priority status with respect to future advances, see Kratovil & Werner, supra note
4, at 311-13; Kuklin, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Article 3, 11 A.B.A. REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 12, 19 (1976), the priority provisions of the ULTA do not provide
a uniform scheme for the determination of the priority status of advances in foreclosure
proceedings. The Conference, however, is encouraging the states to consider the ULTA
in conjunction with the USLTA. See McCabe Letter, supra at 2. The Uniform Con-
dominiums Act, the final component of the total drafting project, was considered for
approval by the Conference at its most recent annual meeting in August, 1977. Id.
"1 Basic goals of both the ULTA and the USLTA include the simplification, clari-
fication, and modernization of the law governing real estate transactions and promo-
tion of the interstate flow of funds for such transactions. See generally ULTA § 1-102;
USLTA § 1-102. More specifically, the provisions that give special priority to advances
made by construction lenders are designed to encourage new construction and the
completion of construction despite cost overruns, and to prevent the abandonment of
buildings. See USLTA § 3-209, Comment.
2 See note 2 supra.
2 ULTA § 3-205(e)(2), 3-301(b)(4); USLTA 99 3-204(4), 5-209(c)(1).
2 A "security agreement" is defined by ULTA § 3-106(6) as "a writing that creates
or provides for a security interest in real estate." The USLTA, however, does not define
that term. A "security interest" is defined by ULTA § 3-103(7) as "an interest in real
estate which secures payment or performance of an obligation." ULTA § 3-102(a)
further indicates that Article 3 of the ULTA applies only to consensual security inter-
ests. Section 1-201(25) of the USLTA defines a "security interest" as "a consensual
interest in real estate which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
Both acts define a "construction security interest" as "a security interest that
secures an obligation which the debtor incurred for the purpose of making an improve-
ment of the real estate in which the security interest is given, if the instrument re-
corded to perfect the interest states that it is a construction security interest." ULTA
§ 3-103(2); USLTA § 1-201(1).
3 See, e.g., USLTA § 3-209, Comment; USLTA § 5-209, Comment 2.
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Case law generally recognizes the secured status of future ad-
vances made under mortgage loans, 4 and in some jurisdictions spe-
cific legislation provides that advances may be so secured.5 Tradi-
tionally, the future advance arrangement may take one of several
forms. In one type of arrangement, the mortgage instrument makes
no mention of future advances. Parol evidence, however, reveals that
only a portion of the stated face amount is given to the mortgagor at
the outset, with advances to be made at later intervals. 6 The mortga-
gee is obligated to make the advances up to the stated sum; thus,
such an arrangement has been characterized as involving "obliga-
tory" future advancesY Another form of mortgage instrument secur-
ing "obligatory" future advances is that in which the mortgagee con-
tractually binds himself under the security agreement to make ad-
vances pursuant to a schedule. This form is most often used by con-
struction lenders, who generally tie the schedule of advances to suc-
cessive stages of completion of the building or improvement in-
volved.2 A third type of mortgage instrument expressly provides for
future advances, but allows the mortgagee discretion in determining
whether he will in fact make the advances. This type of arrangement
has been characterized as involving "optional" future advances.
2
1
The characterization of a mortgage as securing "obligatory" or
"optional" advances has primary significance under existing law in
21 E.g., National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1880); Tapia v. DeMar-
tini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888); Larson Cement Stone Co. v. Redlim Realty Co.,
179 Neb. 134, 137 N.W.2d 241 (1965).
23 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04 (West 1969); MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP.]
§ 7-102 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-67 to -74 (1976 Repl. Vol.).
21 See, e.g., Tapia v. DeMartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888); Whelan v. Exchange
Trust Co., 214 Mass. 121, 100 N.E. 1095 (1913). In Tapia, the court noted that the
express limitation of liability to a definite amount is sufficient to protect subsequent
encumbrances. But see Matz v. Arick, 76 Conn. 388, 56 A. 630 (1904)(failure to state
that mortgage secures future advances was constructively fraudulent against subse-
quent encumbrances except for amount of initial advance).
21 Whelan v. Exchange Trust Co., 214 Mass. 121, 122, 100 N.E. 1095, 1096 (1913).
See also Coke Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 529 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975). 10
SE.g., Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171 Minn.
445, 214 N.W. 503 (1927); Larson Cement Stone Co. v. Redlim Realty Co., 179 Neb.
134, 137 N.W.2d 241 (1965). See also Kemp v. Thurmond, 521 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn.
1975). Courts often hold that advances made ahead of schedule are optional, however,
despite the fact that the lender would eventually be obligated to make them. See cases
cited in note 39, and text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
21 See, e.g., W.P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 185, 191 P. 1027 (1920);
Blaustein v. Aiello, 231 Md. 375, 190 A.2d 639 (1963).
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determining the priority of lien claims in foreclosure proceedings."'
Under traditional priority rules, where provisions in a mortgage obli-
gate the mortgagee to make future advances, the advances receive
priority from the time of recordation of the mortgage over all inter-
vening encumbrances. This priority is accorded obligatory advances
even if the mortgagee has actual knowledge of the intervening lien at
the time he makes them.3 Such advances thus always relate back to
the date of recordation.32 If the mortgagee retains the option of deter-
mining whether advances will be made, however, the mortgagee does
not receive priority with respect to those advances made after he has
acquired knowledge of a subsequent encumbrance.3 3 The majority of
courts require that the mortgagee have actual knowledge 4 of the
subsequent encumbrance before his rights are defeated, although
some courts hold that constructive notice suffices."
Determination of the priority status of future advances in accord-
ance with whether the lender was obligated to advance funds or
whether he did so at his option presents special problems for the
construction lender. The cases often express the test for determining
if an advance was "obligatory" as involving an inquiry into whether
the lender could have been compelled by a court to advance the funds
pursuant to his contractual agreement.3 ' Thus, where refusal by the
lender to make certain advances would have subjected him to liabil-
ity for breach of contract, courts hold that such advances are obliga-
tory.37 The construction lender, however, generally includes provi-
sions in the construction loan agreement which either require that
certain conditions be satisfied pursuant to a schedule before the
3* Some states, however, have legislatively abolished the obligatory-optional dis-
tinction with respect to determining priority of advances. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
697.04 (West 1969); MD. CODE ANN. [REAL PROP.] § 7-102 (1974).
"' See cases cited in note 27 supra.
32 Id.
11 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
31 E.g., Woodruff v. National City Bank, 272 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1959); Tapia v.
DeMartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888).
E.g., McMasters v. Campbell, 41 Mich. 513, 2 N.W. 836 (1879); Swift Lumber
& Fuel Co. v. Elwanger, 127 Neb. 740, 256 N.W. 875 (1934).
3 See, e.g., Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171
Minn. 445, 214 N.W. 503 (1927); National Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886,
506 P.2d 20 (1973).
'" But see Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 33 N.E. 735 (1893)(where loss of profits
or fruits of contract would follow discontinuation of advances such that advances are
not "purely and plainly optional," advances are "obligatory" even though lender is
absolved under contract provision from making them because of owner's default in
making payments).
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lender is obligated to make an advance or relieve the lender of his
obligation to advance funds upon the occurrence of certain events of
default." Since these provisions protect the lender from incurring
contractual liability if the conditions are not met, or if default occurs,
courts generally hold that advances made in such a situation are
thereby rendered optional." Characterizing such advances as op-
tional operates to deny the advances priority status." This test based
on contractual liability has been criticized as ignoring economic reali-
ties which compel the lender either to make advances out of schedule
or to continue making advances after default by the borrower, even
if he is not legally obligated to do so."
The common law distinction between obligatory and optional
advances remains significant under certain provisions of the ULTA
and the USLTA.42 Both acts abandon the use of the terms "obliga-"
tory" and "optional," however, and instead distinguish between
whether or not advances are made "pursuant to commitment."43 The
same definition is set forth in the general provisions of each statute:
P. ROHAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCING § 3.05(4)(1973).
J.I. Kislak Mtge. Corp. v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686 (Del.
Super. 1972); New York & Suburban Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fi-Pen Realty Co.,
133 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1954); National Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886,
506 P.2d 20 (1973); Contra, Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 33 N.E. 735 (1893) (advances
are not "purely and plainly optional" where loss of profits or fruits of contract would
follow discontinuation of advances).
o See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
' It may be economically desirable for the lender who has already invested capital
in a construction project to protect his investment by continuing to advance funds that
are not required according to the loan payout schedule. An unfinished building often
deteriorates in value over time because the building is exposed to vandalism and to
the elements. Furthermore, the building produces no revenue because it cannot be sold
or rented. The lender's foreclosure rights are thus jeopardized when delay is occasioned
by the necessary adjudication of priority rights of lienors prior to a judicial sale. Yet,
should the lender choose to continue advancing funds in order to enable completion of
the building and enhancement of the ultimate value of the security, he loses priority
as to those continued advances under prevailing law because he was not contractually
obligated to make them. See Kratovil & Werner, supra note 4, at 316-19; Skipworth,
supra note 4, at 223.
Some courts have sought to accommodate the economic pressures facing the con-
struction lender by holding that certain advances made by a lender not contractually
bound to make them are nonetheless "obligatory." See, e.g., United States v. Seaboard
Nat'l Bank, 206 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1953) (expenditures for taxes and insurance premiums
obligatory); Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 33 N.E. 735 (1893)(advances to prevent loss
of profits or fruits of contract obligatory).
12 See ULTA § 3-301(b)(1),(2); USLTA § 3-209(1),(2); see also text accompanying
notes 53-57 infra.
1 ULTA § 1-201(15); USLTA § 1-201(14).
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"An advance is made 'pursuant to commitment' if the obligor has
bound himself to make it, whether or not a default or other event not
within his control has relieved or may relieve him from his contrac-
tual obligation."4 This definition apparently refers to contractual
commitments. Significantly, however, it also provides that the lender
may continue to make advances without jeopardizing their secured
status if events beyond his control relieve him of his contractual duty
to make them. 5
In accordance with existing case law,4" ULTA section 3-205(c)
explicitly provides that "[o]bligations secured by a security agree-
ment may include future advances or other future obligations,
whether or not the obligation was incurred pursuant to commit-
ment."' 7 Section 3-205(c) further provides, however, that "except as
to advances made . . . [for the reasonable protection of the security
interest in the real estate or under a construction security agree-
ment], 8 the maximum amount of the obligation secured may not
exceed the maximum amount stated in the agreement."49 While the
USLTA contains no provision comparable to ULTA section 3-205(c),
this same security status of future advances may be inferred from the
USLTA priority provisions concerning advances set forth in section
3-209(l) and (2).11 Clearly, advances must first be secured before they
can receive priority. Under USLTA section 3-209(1) and (2), priority
is given to advances made pursuant to commitment as well as to
advances not made pursuant to commitment." Moreover, priority is
limited under those subsections to the extent of advances "which do
not exceed the maximum amount stated in the record."5
2
The general priority rules of ULTA section 3-301(b) and USLTA
section 3-209 incorporate traditional priority notions, 3 but substitute
the distinction between advances made pursuant to commitment and
those not made pursuant to commitment for the obligatory-optional
4 Id.
IS The same provision concerning when advances are made "pursuant to commit-
ment" is contained in U.C.C. § 9-105(k), and is applicable with respect to the future
advance provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C. See also OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
5301.23.2(E)(4) (Page 1970 Repl. Vol.).
"8 See note 24 supra.
.7 ULTA § 3-205(c).
" See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra. See also note 67 infra.
ULTA § 3-205(c).
, See also USLTA § 5-209(c)(1).
5, USLTA § 3-209(1),(2).
52 Id.
"' See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
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distinction.' All secured advances made pursuant to commitment
have priority over intervening interests from the date the security
interest was recorded insofar as they do not exceed the maximum
stated in the record.5 Advances not made pursuant to commitment
receive priority over intervening interests as of the recording date to
the extent of advances made before the secured party had knowledge
of the intervening interest and not exceeding the stated maximum.56
Under both acts, a person has "knowledge" of a fact only when he
has actual knowledge of it." Constructive notice through recordation
of an intervening interest therefore would not suffice under either
statute.
Both the ULTA and the USLTA use the term "security interest"
to refer to consensual interests in real estate.5 Furthermore, the refer-
ences to priority of advances over intervening interests in the general
priority rules of ULTA section 3-301(b) and USLTA section 3-209 do
not come into play when an intervening interest is a non-consensual
mechanics' lien." Article 3 of the ULTA expressly excludes the me-
chanics' lien from the scope of its provisions. 5 Thus, adoption of that
statute would not affect the continued applicability of a state's me-
chanics' lien statute in the resolution of priority conflicts between
mechanics' liens and future advances.
6'
The USLTA, however, devotes an entire article to the codification
of mechanics' lien law." Accordingly, USLTA section 3-209 provides
-, See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
ULTA § 3-301(b)(1); USLTA § 3-209(1).
ULTA § 3-301(b)(2); USLTA § 3-209(2).
', ULTA § 1-202(b); USLTA § 1-202(b).
See note 22 supra.
The priority rules of the ULTA apply exclusively to consensual security inter-
ests. Section 3-104(3) of the Act clearly states that Article 3 does not apply to any non-
consensual lien. The USLTA, however, does not contain such a sweeping exclusionary
provision. Instead, USLTA § 4-101(a) brings within the ambit of that Act's priority
provisions any lien "created or recognized by this Act or by any other law. . ." Section
3-209 excludes only the mechanics' lien from its scope, subjecting its provisions to
those of § 5-209, a section specifically concerning the priority of mechanics' liens. See
text accompanying notes 62-66 infra.
"0 ULTA § 3-104(3). An article which did concern the priority of advances made
by a construction lender as against mechanics' liens was contained in early drafts of
the ULTA, but was not adopted as part of the final version of the Act. See note 18
supra.
, See note 18 supra.
, USLTA Article 5 deals comprehensively with the subject of mechanics' liens.
The Article is entitled "Construction Liens" because, according to the drafters, the
title "Mechanics' Liens" improperly implies that laborers are the primary beneficiaries
of mechanics' lien laws. USLTA Art. 5, Introductory Comment. Despite the fact that
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that section 5-209 of that Act controls the priority of future advances
when an intervening claim is a mechanics' lien.6" Section 5-209(b)
states the general rule that a mechanics' lien has priority over all
subsequent advances made with knowledge that the lien has at-
tached, 4 whether or not the advance was made pursuant to a com-
mitment in a mortgage recorded before the lien attached. 5 This pro-
vision gives the intervening mechanics' lienor greater priority over
subsequent advances than is given the intervening secured party
under USLTA section 3-209(1) and (2).66
A significant feature of both the ULTA and the USLTA is the
inclusion in each statute of special provisions that apply exclusively
to advances made under a construction security agreement." These
the term "mechanics' lien" may be technically incorrect, that term has been in use
for well over-one hundred years, see generally OsBoRNE, supra note 1, at § 214, and
the term "construction lien" is likely to cause more confusion because the mortgage
given a construction lender may properly be referred to as a lien. To avoid such
confusion, this writer uses the term "mechanics' lien" throughout this article when
referring to provisions of Article 5 of the USLTA.
13 USLTA § 3-209.
"4 USLTA § 5-207 states when a mechanics' lien attaches for priority purposes
under Article 5.
:1 USLTA § 5-209(b).
' See also ULTA § 3-301(b). Under ULTA § 3-301(b)(1) and USLTA § 3-209(1),
all advances made by a lender pursuant to commitment, see text accompanying notes
43-44 supra, receive priority over intervening consensual security interests, even if the
lender had knowledge of the intervening interest at the time he made the advances.
Under USLTA § 5-209(b), however, those advances made by the lender with knowledge
of an intervening mechanics' lien do not receive priority over the mechanics' lien. This
greater protection of the mechanics' lienor reflects a policy determination that such
claimants deserve favored treatment.
6 See notes 2, 21 and 22, and text accompanying notes 20-23 supra. The ULTA
and the USLTA also accord the same special treatment to future advances made "for
the reasonable protection of the security interest in the real estate." See ULTA §§ 3-
205(e)(1), 3-301(b)(3); USLTA §§ 3-209(3); 5-209(c)(2). Such advances include pay-
ments "for real property taxes, hazard insurance premiums, or maintenance charges
imposed under a condominium declaration or other covenant." Id. It is not uncommon
for a mortgagee to make such expenditures to protect his interest in the real estate even
if he is not legally or contractually obligated to do so. For this reason, some courts have
held that these advances enjoy priority from the date the mortgage was first recorded.
United States v. Seaboard Citizens Nat'l Bank, 206 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1953); Harper v.
Ely, 70 Ill. 581 (1873). But see Heller v. Gate City Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 75 N.M. 596,
598-99, 408 P.2d 753, 755-56 (1965)(advances for taxes, insurance premiums and re-
pairs, which were "wholly discretionary" with the mortgagee, were denied priority
against a purchase money mortgage claim which had been subordinated to the con-
struction loan only with respect to obligatory advances). The drafters of the ULTA and
USLTA apparently have adopted the view that all mortgagees are "obligated" to make
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provisions are intended to accommodate the economic pressures
faced by construction lenders"8 in an effort to encourage lenders to
advance funds in every case where to do so would enable completion
of a construction project. 9 Thus, ULTA section 3-205(e) expressly
provides that such advances:
are secured by the security agreement even though the security
agreement does not provide for future advances or obligations
or the advances cause the total of future advances or obliga-
tions to exceed the maximum amount stated in the security
agreement30
Advances made by the construction lender are thereby specifically
exempted from the face amount limitation imposed by ULTA section
3-205(c) on other lenders.
71
Under the USLTA, this same security status of advances made by
construction lenders may be inferred from that statute's priority pro-
visions concerning future advances made under construction security
agreements.12 Both USLTA section 3-209(4) and USLTA section 5-
209(c) (1) address the priority of advances made by construction lend-
ers,73 providing that such advances have priority "whether or not
[they] exceed the secured maximum amount stated in the instru-
ment." Advances exceeding the face amount must necessarily be
secured to receive a priority status.
ULTA section 3-301(b)(4) and USLTA section 3-209(4) specifi-
cally concern the priority of future advances made under a construc-
tion security agreement "to enable completion of the agreed improve-
ment of the real estate." 5 Both provisions state that a recorded secu-
rity interest takes priority:
as of the date of its recording as to advances or obligation
thereafter made or incurred under the security agreement
such advances. See Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. REv.
209, 221 (1956).
0 See note 41 supra.
" See USLTA § 3-209, Comment; USLTA § 5-209, Comment 2.
7' ULTA § 3-205(e).
71 Id.
72 See ULTA § 3-209(4); USLTA § 5-209(c)(1). See also text accompanying notes
49-51 supra.
73 ULTA § 3-209(4); USLTA § 5-209(c)(1).
74 Id.
11 ULTA § 3-301(b)(4); USLTA § 3-209(4).
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... if made under a construction security interest to enable
completion of the agreed improvement of the real estate,
whether or not the advances or obligations exceed the secured
maximum amount stated in the instrument or the secured
creditor had knowledge of the intervening interest.
7
1
Thus, under the ULTA and the USLTA, a construction lender re-
ceives priority over intervening security interests from the time the
mortgage was recorded for all advances made "to enable completion"
of the construction, regardless of whether they were made pursuant
to commitment.
77
The Comment to USLTA section 3-209 states that "[m]ajor pol-
icy reasons" support according this special priority to advances made
by the construction lender "to enable completion" of construction.
78
The listed policy reasons include the encouragement of construction
starts, the completion of construction projects despite cost over-runs,
and the prevention of building abandonment.79 Nevertheless, ULTA
section 3-301(b)(4) and USLTA section 3-209(4) may go beyond pro-
tecting advances made by the construction lender and in fact used
to complete the project. Since the provision requires only that the
advances be made under a construction security agreement to enable
completion of construction, advances arguably receive priority even
if they are diverted from construction by the borrower. This allow-
ance of priority to diverted funds clearly does not forward the policy
goals set forth in the Comment to USLTA section 3-209.
In contrast to ULTA section 3-301(b)(4) and USLTA section 3-
209(4), USLTA section 5-209(c)(1) denies the construction lender
priority with respect to diverted funds when an intervening encum-
76 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
USLTA § 3-209, Comment.
7: Id.
" According priority to funds advanced "to enable completion" of the improve-
ment but diverted by the borrower appears inevitable under the USLTA. The special
provision concerning the priority of advances when an intervening interest is a mechan-
ics' lien accords the construction lender priority only for advances made "in payment
of the price" of the improvement, not for all funds advanced "to enable completion"
of the improvement. USLTA § 5-209(c)(1). Comment 2 to § 5-209 specifically indicates
that the language of USLTA § 5-209(c)(1) is intended to protect the mechanics' lien
claimant against possible diversion of funds by the borrower. See text accompanying
notes 81-87 infra. Arguably, if the drafters of the USLTA intended to give consensual
lien claimants similar protection against diversion, they would have used the "in
payment of the price" language rather than the "to enable completion" language in §
3-209(4).
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brance is a mechanics' lien. The provision states that advances made
under a construction security agreement have priority over a mechan-
ics' lien only if the security agreement was recorded before the lien
attached and if the subsequent advance was made "in payment of the
price of the agreed improvements."'" The requirement that the con-
struction security agreement be recorded prior to the attachment of
the lien accords with basic recording principles. The further require-
ment that the advances be made "in payment of the price" of an
improvement, rather than "to enable completion" of an improve-
ment, gives the mechanics' lien claimant significant protection
against possible diversion of funds." The priority of advances di-
Under the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, cash advances made after tax lien filing
but pursuant to a written real property construction or improvement financing agree-
ment entered into before tax lien filing are accorded priority as against the intervening
tax lien. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(1)(A)(ii). The Act further provides that the agreement must
be to make cash disbursements "to finance" the construction or improvement (or a
contract to construct or improve), but does not specifically address the question of
diversion of funds by the borrower. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(3)(A)(i),(ii). However, since the
underlying policy rationale for the special priority given such advances is that they
generally enhance the value of the property for the purposes of the tax lien, the legisla-
tive intent appears to be that the disbursement must in fact finance the construction
or improvement. See S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3722, 3723.
AI Id.
R2 See text accompanying note 79 supra. USLTA § 5-209(c)(1) places a distinct
burden on construction lenders to advance funds with reasonable diligence and to
insure that the funds are actually used in the construction project. Since the construc-
tion lender must accept this burden in every case to prevent the diversion of funds and
thereby maintain his priority over mechanics' lien claimants, he would assume no
greater burden if he were denied priority over intervening consensual security interests
under USLTA § 3-209(4) when diversion eoes occur. See also ULTA § 3-301(b)(4).
Allowance of priority to diverted funds presents particular problems under exist-
ing law for the seller of land who takes a purchase money mortgage from his buyer. A
construction lender normally requires the purchase money mortgagee to enter into an
agreement by which he subordinates his otherwise paramount interest to that of the
construction lender. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Betts, 33 Md. App. 258, 364 A.2d 74, (Ct.
Spec. App. 1976); Cambridge Acceptance Corp. v. Hockstein, 102 N.J. Super. 435,
246 A.2d 138 (1968)(per curiam). Should the purchase money mortgagee execute an
unqualified and unconditional subordination agreement, all advances made by the
construction lender receive priority over the purchase money claim. Forest Inc. v.
Guaranty Mtge. Co., 534 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1975). In the more common
situation, when the purchase money mortgagee agrees to subordinate on condition that
advances be made according to a schedule determined by various stages of completion,
his claim retains its priority with respect to advances made in excess of those stipu-
lated in the schedule. Housing Mtge. Corp. v. Allied Constr. Inc., 374 Pa. 312, 97 A.2d
802 (1953); 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 742,
at 1104 (8th ed. 1928). See generally Bell, Negotiating the Purchase-Money Mortgage,
7 REAL EST. Rev. 51, 52-54 (1977).
1039
1040 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
verted by the borrower to some purpose other than payment of a
prime contractor or a lien claimant on the job is governed by section
5-209(b). Under that subsection, diverted advances are subordinated
to the mechanics' lien if they were made with knowledge that the lien
had attached.83
USLTA section 5-209(c) (1) strikes a balance between the compet-
ing interests of the construction lender and the mechanics' lienor. On
the one hand, funds advanced by the construction lender and in fact
used to complete construction enhance the value of the security. The
services and materials supplied by the mechanics' lienor also add
value to the security, but "more often than not it is to the interests
In applying the traditional rules of priority, the majority of courts hold that the
purchase money mortgagee must assume the risk that the borrower will divert ad-
vanced funds that are given priority under the subordination agreement. Only if the
lender had agreed to monitor the application of the funds advanced, or engaged in
collusion with the borrower in the diversion of funds, does the purchase money mortga-
gee retain priority with respect to any diverted funds. Kennedy v. Betts, 33 Md. App.
258, 364 A.2d 74, (Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Forest Inc. v. Guaranty Mtge. Co., 534
S.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1975); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.10D, at 218 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952). Cf. Cambridge Acceptance Corp. v. Hockstein, 102 N.J. Super. 435,
438, 246 A.2d 138, 141 (1968)(per curiam). In Hockstein, the court held that a lender's
total indifference to whether advanced funds were applied to the construction was
evidence that the designated "construction loan" was essentially a camouflage for a
loan on the general credit of the borrower and the security of the land. Since the
subordination agreement extended only to genuine construction loans, the court denied
priority to diverted advances. The court nevertheless noted that "under general princi-
ples of mortgage subordination law . ., a construction lender taking the benefit of a
subordination is not a guarantor to the subordinator or liable to him for mere negli-
gence in seeing to the appropriation of the moneys to the construction..." Id. Contra,
First Nat'l Bank v. Virden, 208 Miss. 679, 682, 45 So. 2d 268, 270-71 (1950) (construc-
tion lender should advance funds with "reasonable diligence" so that holders of statu-
tory liens will not be unjustly defeated in their claims; lender has priority only to the
extent that its funds actually went into construction).
The purchase money mortgagee may avoid the harsh rules of the prevailing law
only by providing in the subordination agreement that his claim is not subordinated
to any advances that are not applied to the construction project. Even though he is
compelled to subordinate so that the mortgagor may obtain funds for construction, the
onus remains upon him to limit narrowly the terms of the subordination agreement.
Since the ULTA and the USLTA do not specifically address the priority status of
purchase money claims, the preferred status given the purchase money mortgagee
under existing law, see generally OSBORNE, supra note 1, at § 213, is not altered under
either statute. Nor are interpretations of the terms of a subordination agreement gov-
erned by any specific statutory provisions. Thus, the courts remain free to continue to
interpret agreements that are not narrowly drawn to allow for subordination of the
purchase money interest to funds advanced according to schedule but subsequently
diverted by the borrower.
8 USLTA § 5-209(b).
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of [mechanics' lienors] as a class to have the construction lender
supply funds to the project."84 Thus, funds advanced by the lender
and applied to the construction project receive priority even if the
lender had knowledge that a mechanics' lien had attached., On the
other hand, funds advanced by the construction lender but diverted
by the borrower do not enhance the value of the security. The claim
for the value-adding services and materials of the mechanics' lienor
consequently prevails over the diverted advances if the advances were
made with knowledge that the mechanics' lien had attached. "
The provisions dealing with future advances in the ULTA and
USLTA represent a long overdue attempt to codify an area of real
estate law that is of significant concern to the construction industry
and to construction lenders. The present law of future advances is
basically decisional and varies from state to state." Questions of
priority of lien claimants cannot readily be determined, and this
uncertainty may impede real estate development, particularly in un-
favorable economic periods."8 Uniform legislation in the area is there-
fore desirable, and the ULTA and USLTA provisions accordingly
deserve careful study by state legislatures. The states must recognize,
however, that the ULTA and USLTA as individual statutes do not
provide comprehensive coverage of the law of future advances.89 Fur-
thermore, while both statutes recognize tthe importance of encourag-
ing construction and the completion of construction projects, the spe-
cial priorities accorded construction lenders" do not take into account
the problem of diversion of advanced funds when an intervening in-
terest is not a mechanics' lien claim." Integration as well as revision
of the provisions and concepts of each statute is therefore necessary
to achieve the desired uniformity in this area of the law.
EMILIA M. DEMEO
' USLTA § 5-209, Comment 2.
USLTA § 5-209(c)(1).
USLTA § 5-209(b).
97 See notes 5-6 supra.
Kratovil & Werner, supra note 4, at 321-22.
" See note 18 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 74-85 supra.
" Id.
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